Remember this:
Alarm emergency goes off during Kennedy RFK announce - C-Span
https://twitter.com/HouseAdmin/status/1708185317797175533?ref_src=twsrc^tfw
View: https://twitter.com/bennyjohnson/status/1708188510136496593
View: https://twitter.com/greg_price11/status/1708192193993703504
Meanwhile...
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/us-military-laying-groundwork-reinstitute-draft
From the comments:
15 hours ago
Fast path to citizenship, + family reunification - enlist - wait for it, wait for it!
14 hours ago
I think this too. All those "immigrants" are in a trap.
There's chatter about militia camps populated by migrants popping up in American open spaces - suggestions too of ones consisting of Americans led by embedded Feds, and a warning about a deterioration public order leading to extraordinary measures. Could be all alarmism - the FEMA camps never materialised - but there could be preparations being made for a future war, with these participants being the first to be conscripted. It would be a dangerous strategy and seems unlikely - why would a country preparing for war dismantle so much of its war-making potential?
Anyway, the paper that created the above article can be found here:
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3233&context=parameters. It's been published on the interwebs - could just be aspirational. Some quotes below:
When Milley served as Chief of Staff of the Army, he explained mission command through a concept of “disciplined disobedience” in which subordinates are empowered to accomplish a mission to achieve the commander’s intended purpose—even if they must disobey a specific order or task to do so. Without perfect communication, a subordinate officer or soldier must be trusted to make the right judgment call during battle, unencumbered by the need to seek approval for small adjustments.9
[a restraint on tactical micromanagement by staff officers has always been the marker in differences in operational quality between armies - standards of conduct are too, let's hope these are not also referenced in Milley's initiative]
...
The Russia-Ukraine War is exposing significant vulnerabilities in the Army’s strategic personnel depth and ability to withstand and replace casualties.11 Army theater medical planners may anticipate a sustained rate of roughly 3,600 casualties per day, ranging from those killed in action to those wounded in action or suffering disease or other non-battle injuries.12 With a 25 percent predicted replacement rate, the personnel system will require 800 new personnel each day. For context, the United States sustained about 50,000 casualties in two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. In large-scale combat operations, the United States could experience that same number of casualties in two weeks.13
...
In addition to the disciplined disobedience required to execute effective mission command, the US Army is facing a dire combination of a recruiting shortfall and a shrinking Individual Ready Reserve. This recruiting shortfall, nearly 50 percent in the combat arms career management fields, is a longitudinal problem. Every infantry and armor soldier we do not recruit today is a strategic mobilization asset we will not have in 2031.14 The Individual Ready Reserve, which stood at 700,000 in 1973 and 450,000 in 1994, now stands at 76,000.15 These numbers cannot fill the existing gaps in the active force, let alone any casualty replacement or expansion during a large scale combat operation. The implication is that the 1970s concept of an all-volunteer force has outlived its shelf life and does not align with the current operating environment. The technological revolution described below suggests this force has reached obsolescence. Large-scale combat operations troop requirements may well require a reconceptualization of the 1970s and 1980s volunteer force and a move toward partial conscription.
...
Beyond the military changes, transnational corporations in the commercial sector are playing an operationally significant role in the artificial intelligence and information battlespace. These private companies are exponentially increasing the effectiveness of intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination, dynamic targeting, and fire [control]. A public-private partnership founded on transparency is essential when preparing for and while engaging in conflict. This partnership should be formed in garrison, and training exercises with private companies should be incorporated into wargames, planning, exercises, and experimentation to ensure that soldiers are familiar with the systems that may prove vital in future combat—and so that the private companies can gain a better understanding of what capabilities the military needs.18
[pretty good definition of this military/industrial complex thing that Kennedy was speaking about]
...
The communication and visualization requirements for an all-knowing, all-seeing MDO [Multi Domain Operations] task force are significant and largely immobile, meaning the smaller maneuver units must understand the capabilities of an MDO task force without necessarily having unencumbered access to it. The smaller units must anticipate gaps in enemy defenses and exploit emergent advantages.22 Anticipation, exploitation, and mission command do not happen organically; all require education, training, and doctrine.
[high caliber demands on candidates]
...
Today’s Army is reminiscent of the Army of 1973, rife with experience, knowledge, and opportunities to change.
...
[DePuy] believed that officers must be intellectually capable and placed a premium on those who could solve problems with speed and quickly institutionalize
change across the organization.
...
Although modernization is often focused on the material aspect of progress, the heavy lifting occurs when integrating new material with doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities. To remain relevant to the pace of the rapidly changing character of war, TRADOC must lead this initiative now, adapting education and training in real time. Although crisis acts as a useful crucible for innovation, the US Army must ensure it captures these rapid changes in a manner that can be immediately written into doctrine, implemented in training, and woven into the daily lives of soldiers in garrison and combat.
www.newsweek.com
www.salon.com
